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Abstract: This paper lays out a two-part strategy to improve the effectiveness of the state in India 
reduce the scope of the state and then improve its capability. It argues that the state tries to do 
too many things and ends up doing many of them badly. It must reduce its scope and change 
the way it does things – reduce their complexity. It must also strengthen the capabilities of the 
state institutions – especially those dealing with administrative functions and rule of law. The state 
must also build up the capability of local administration and increase its financing. It must also 
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“Institutions, not armies, determine the destinies of nations” Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
 Among the many things COVID-19 exposed, is not just how weak is India’s health 
system but more broadly how insufficient is India’s state capacity to manage and 
coordinate and to deliver responses to such shocks  India has seen, reportedly,2 lower 
incidence rates and death rates per capita compared to most western countries, but 
within Asia it remains amongst the most severely affected country. But these 
weaknesses were evident in its inability to deliver basic public services like health and 
education well before the pandemic hit.  
            A reform of the state to reduce its scope and increase its effectiveness at all 
levels is badly needed to reset India for the 21st century.  It was a reform India needed 
even before the pandemic, but its urgency has now been brought to the forefront – not 
only to deal with future emergencies, but also if India is to emerge as an economic 
power in the 21st century and be a happier country with social justice and a healthy 
democracy.   
          This paper tries to lay out the broad contours of that reform, what it would entail 
and how to prioritize in such an ambitious undertaking.  
 
I. What Kind of State does India have?  
 There is a saying on the front of the Vidhan Sabha of Karnataka in the city of 
Mysore “Government Work is God’s work”. This was meant to be a positive motivator– 
but now usually elicits a laugh – as the government is seen as overbearing and 
omnipotent in a not so positive manner and corruption-ridden. Sarkari Raj permeates all 
aspects of life in India.  
India’s state is more welfarist than developmental. But it does not even do 
welfare very well. That is why the term “welfarist” – that the intent is welfare but not the 
outcome is more appropriate.  India also aspires to be a developmental state but 
spends so little on basics like education, health, infrastructure that it can hardly be 
called one.  
The size of the government, even adding in sub-national governments, is not too 
large3 but its scope is very wide. As a result, it ends up trying to do too much and end 
up doing things badly. Some have called it the “flailing” state – suggesting that the 
head and its limbs are not well coordinated.4 It has a penchant for grand schemes and 
 
2 India’s official numbers on incidence and deaths are probably a substantial under-count  
3 Kapur (2020) says it’s too small – but he looks at tax receipts not at total receipts and when we add 
large fiscal deficits the total government spend is not too low by India’s level of GDP.  
4 Pritchett, Lant. 2009. Is India a Flailing State? Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization. 
HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-013, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. 
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plans – whose execution is weak. Some even argue that India has developed despite 
the state and that India grows at night when the government sleeps. 5  
India’s constitution was amended to add the word “socialistic”. That again 
showed no clarity on intent – neither socialist nor capitalist – a muddled hybrid. Since 
the 1991 liberalisation India has become over time more capitalist but its capitalists 
remain highly dependent on the state.  The Modi government which came to power in 
2014 said “the business of government is not business”. But getting the government out 
of business has not yet seen much success and the state remains omnipotent – perhaps 
even more so.   
Because India is a democracy it cannot be an overly predatory state like in 
kleptocracies such as Congo 6 The poor are the vote banks and are doled out larger 
and larger promises of programs and subsidies – which are then poorly distributed – 
subject to huge leakages. The voters keep government from becoming too predatory 
by throwing out government ever so often. It is a form of populism exercised every time 
there is an election.  The electoral cycle doles out more and more hand-outs, what 
people need are steady hand-ups to help them stand on their own feet through better 
education, health, electricity, roads and decent jobs.  
Mehta and Walton (2014)7 pose these dilemmas of the Indian state by presenting 
three positive attributes of the Indian state – its stated objectives and its outcomes as 
three negative realities. They argue that the Indian state wants to be seen as a provider 
of services and protector of the disadvantaged ; but also as a social welfare state built 
on the rights of citizens and as a handmaiden of capitalist development to make India 
an economically great nation in the world and that different parts of the political 
system and the bureaucracy espouse these objectives. But the reality is quite different 
from those laudable objectives. The state has become more a mechanism of 
distributing privileges to individuals and groups, more populist and captured by 
capitalist interest groups increasing inequalities and damaging the environment.8 
This constant and continuous struggle between these aspects of the state have 
played out but as we shall we see in this chapter the negative outcomes are winning 
out in various ways and unless a major reset is undertaken will hold back India in the 21st 
century. This nexus between India’s capitalists and the state – and the growing 
illiberalism of the state – towards dissent, towards minorities and the destruction of 
independent institutions is document also in a recent book Kaur (2020) – and is not 
unique to India.  
 
5 India Grows at Night: A Liberal Case for a Strong State Hardcover – December 12, 2012 by Gurcharan 
Das.  
6 Evans, Peter B. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy 
Perspective on the Third World State.” Sociological Forum, vol. 4, no. 4, 1989, pp. 561–587. 
7 ESID Working Paper No. 36 Ideas, interests and the politics of development change in India: capitalism, 
inclusion and the state:  Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Michael Walton July 2014 
8 See also Bardhan (1996) for a review of the role of the state.  
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II. Some History: How Did We Get here? 
The Arthashastra laid out the principles of good governance and state 
administration by Chanakya (Kautilya) as early 300 BC – but were then forgotten for 
centuries after the Gupta Empire crumbled around 600 AD.  In amazing detail, the 
principles of public administration were laid out and explained – from taxation, tax 
administration, judicial administration, activities of various departments, foreign policy, 
to dealing with epidemics, famines and catastrophes like fires and floods. With such 
attention to the conduct of the state it is not surprising that Indian flourished during the 
Mauryan empire.  
Another golden period was the rule of Akbar the Great during the Mughal 
empire around 1600 when taxation was tempered, wars were contained and trade 
and commerce flourished – but all this soon disappeared as in fighting and wars 
exacted huge pressures towards greater taxation and by the time of Aurangzeb’s rule 
was over around 1700, the empire was already in decline.  
Pre-independence most Indians were used to a colonial style government that 
provided rudimentary security but not much else. 9Even at times of extreme 
catastrophe – such as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, or during massive famines in 1944 
the government did very little to help people10. Whatever help came, it came largely as 
a by-product of the colonial interest. The railway system was not designed to develop 
India but to carry products needed by England to the ports and for military logistics. The 
plunder of India by the British was well documented early on by eminent scholars like 
Dadabhai Naoroji and one of the best accounts recently is by Tharoor (2016).  
As a result, between 1900 and 1950 India’s GDP did not grow at all and at 
independence almost 80 percent of the population were in extreme poverty. As Dr 
Manmohan Singh11 summarized it well, “There is no doubt that our grievances against the 
British Empire had a sound basis. As the painstaking statistical work of the Cambridge historian 
Angus Maddison has shown, India's share of world income collapsed from 22.6% in 1700, almost 
equal to Europe's share of 23.3% at that time, to as low as 3.8% in 1952. Indeed, at the beginning of 
the 20th century, "the brightest jewel in the British Crown" was the poorest country in the world in 
terms of per capita income.” 
           With independence India swung from a minimalist extractive colonial state to the 
other extreme. Enamored by the industrial success of the USSR, Prime Minister Nehru 
espoused a state-led development model where the “commanding heights of the 
Indian economy “would be in state hands. In 1956 with the Industrial Policy Resolution 
 
9 Kapur (2020) shows that British India spent even less than other colonial administrations. Perhaps that 
was good as it meant less taxation and had it spent more it would probably have not been to help India’s 
development but to meet colonial interests.  
10 In fact, as brought out in Tharoor (2018) under Churchill’s orders grain was moved from India to 
southern Europe for troops fighting there while millions starved  
11 "Of Oxford, economics, empire, and freedom". The Hindu. Chennai. 2 October 2005. Retrieved 2010-
12-06. 
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India restricted key sectors of the economy to the state, nationalized some companies 
which were considered strategic like air lines and shipbuilding. Subsequently India 
nationalised large parts of its financial system, as well as some sectors such as coal and 
steel.                            
Figure1: Degrees of State Intervention 
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                                Source: Adapted from World Development Report 1997, World Bank 
Figure 1 adapted from the 1997 World Development Report shows degrees of 
state intervention. Based on this India covered pretty much all the possibilities of state 
intervention – except perhaps for asset distribution – although nationalization could be 
considered a form of asset distribution. But India did not do serious land reform as was 
done in many East Asian countries. 12The key goals of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 
1956 were - i to build infrastructure and promote industrialization, ii. To promote 
employment and balanced regional development, iii. To create a self-reliant economy 
 
12 See also Kelkar and Shah (2019) for numerous examples of where the Indian state intervenes far 
beyond justified reasons for intervention such as addressing market failure, provision of public goods and 
asymmetric information.  
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through import substitution and promote exports, iv. To generate surpluses for 
development, v. To prevent concentration of economic power. During this period, 
public sector investment reached over 50 % of total investment. Many new public 
sector companies were established and private companies in sectors such as coal, 
airlines, banking and insurance were nationalized.  
Industrial licensing was introduced - prescribing what the public and the private 
sector could produce.13 India was not the only country in the developing world that 
went down this path after WWII. Most post -colonial countries went down this path 
across Africa and Asia but so did countries like China and others in Latin America. 
Import substitution and state led planned development became the model across 
much of the developing world. In India this involved not only setting up state -owned 
enterprises but also efforts to control and plan private sector development. An entire 
apparatus - often referred to as the "license-raj" was established to make decisions on 
the number and types of licenses.  
The license-raj combined with inefficient public enterprises nurtured inefficiency 
and corruption, producing a bevy of intermediaries, whose main function was to grab 
these licenses and sell them off to the highest bidder. Prof Raj Krishna called the license-
raj, "Socialist allocation in the first round followed by market allocation in the second 
round". In some cases, large private business houses would grab the license to expand 
production but delay its execution in order to benefit from the shortages, or just keep 
the license unutilized to stave off a competitor from entry into the industry. One of the 
original objectives of the policy to establish PSE's was to help industrialize the economy 
and build infrastructure: especially as was then thought the private sector was unwilling 
to enter.  
Soon after independence the sense was that the private sector was too weak to 
be able to handle risks especially in capital intensive sectors. But unlike Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan which relied on a strategy of helping the private sector grow and reduce 
their risks, India followed the approach of setting up public sector companies. Such 
thinking was not just Nehruvian socialism but strongly supported by the industrial class of 
the day. 14 
But this approach proved disastrous and India's GDP growth remained low 
averaging only 3.5 % between 1950 and 1980, in the first  3 decades after 
independence with per capita GDP growing at only 1.3% on average.15 It was famously 
called the "Hindu growth rate" suggesting that Hindu fatalism was responsible for this 
slow growth, but as we saw later when with better policies India grew faster, Hinduism 
 
13 See Mohan and Aggarwal (1990) for a detailed description and its history of India’s license-raj regime. 
14 Ajay Chhibber (2019) in an article published in a book on the Bombay Plan edited by Sanjaya Baru and 
Meghnad Desai “shows that “…the parenthood of India’s shift to State Planning is hard pin on Prime 
Minister Nehru alone. Even the top industrialists of that time, JRD Tata and GD Birla, were pushing for 
State control and planning as co-authors of the Bombay Plan.” 
15 This was of course faster than growth in the period 1900-1950, but well below what other developing 
countries in East Asia and Latin America were able to achieve especially after 1965.  
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had nothing to do with it. India's poverty rose during this period and India fell behind 
many countries on social and economic indicators. Some internal liberalization was 
pursued in the 1980's, but it was insufficient to address the growing problems in the 
economy. It eventually took a balance of payments crisis in 1991 to force the political 
establishment to accept the need for reform.  
After pursuing state-led capitalism for four decades after Independence, 
triggered by a major economic and financial crisis, India introduced a new industrial 
policy in the 1990s. Given the perception that state-led capitalism had failed there was 
a significant change in thinking after the 1991 liberalization. The private sector could 
enter many restricted areas especially in mining, power generation and in 
telecommunications and airlines. The state had expanded its role in certain priority 
areas like electricity. But subsequently state control on the economy was reduced. The 
Electricity Act 2003 was enacted which completely de-licensed power generation and 
also permitted captive power plants. It also facilitated private sector participation in 
transmission sector and provide open access to grid sector. Various policy measures 
facilitated increased private sector participation in key infrastructure sectors such as, 
telecommunication, roads and ports. Foreign equity participation up to 100 per cent 
was allowed in construction and maintenance of roads and bridges 
 
III. The Broad Strategy for State Reform 
What does reform of government entail? The size of India's government is not 
outlandishly large - but its scope is very wide and as a result its capabilities are declining 
over time. Despite the 1991 reforms, which rid us of the license raj, the government still 
remains involved in too many things and its new regulatory structure has reverted to a 
pseudo license raj that it thought it rid itself of in the 1990s. And now judicial activism 
triggered by brazen corruption (scams) creates its own uncertainty. As they say, in India, 
unlike in East Asia, even the corruption is unpredictable. 
The size as measured by government expenditure in fact increased – between 
1980-81 to 1991-92 and has since remained in the range of 26-31% of GDP – averaging 
around 28%.  What has changed is the composition – more money is now spent by state 
governments since the acceptance of the recommendation of the 14th Finance 
Commission (Figure 2). The GST was another major reform – heralded as a major– the 
recent imbroglio over GST – has shown how quickly the central government can take 
back what they promised. As GST revenues fell sharply in 2020 due to the pandemic the 
central government reneged on its promise to increase state GST revenue share by 14% 
every year and has now provided states the option to borrow on their behalf the 
shortfall in revenue. This has soured center-state relations and put the entire spirit of 
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“cooperative federalism” in jeopardy. This has also meant that further reform of GST – to 
bring in petrol, real estate and liquor into the GST is now unlikely. 16 
But while government spend remains at around 28% of GDP overall revenues 
have only been in the range 21% of GDP – so that the combined deficit of state and 
central government has been around 7% of GDP. Financing this deficit has meant huge 
financial repression – as India has run a current account deficit of only around 2% of 
GDP this has meant that around 5% of combined government deficit was financed by 
domestic savings. Such large financing needs has meant substantial financial repression 
– which has distorted India’s financial system. The GST promised an increase in revenues 
by 2-3 % of GDP, but with a botched start and major design issues whose resolution is 
now in jeopardy that promise will not be realized for some time to come.  
Figure 2: Government Expenditure by Centre and States in India   
 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy: Reserve Bank of India, various issues  
Some argue that the Indian state is too small. Kapur (2020) makes that case 
adjusting taxpayers and tax revenue as a share of GDP. But he makes an odd 
adjustment for democracy to make the case that India is below the cross-country 
regression. There is no compelling reason why democracies need to collect higher 
taxes. Many socialist non-democracies who provide more government services to their 
citizens must also raise more taxes. But he also misses out India’s huge non-tax revenues. 
India also runs large fiscal deficits both at the centre and in the states so a better 
comparison would be to compare India’s total government spend as a share of GDP. 
 
16 And as Kelkar and Shah (2019) point out it would have been better to have started with a single rate 
GST with additional revenue collected in the form of luxury or sin taxes and introduce complexity once the 
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Here as Figures 3 and 4 show India spends as much as a share of GDP as many 
countries at higher GDP levels.  
Figure 3: India Revenue Comparison with OECD and select Emerging Economies 
 
Figure 4: India Expenditure Comparison with OECD and select Emerging 
Economies 
 
Figure 5 adapted from the World Development Report 1997 and Fukuyama 
(2004) demonstrates how state effectiveness is determined by its scope of intervention 
and capability17. For any specific level of capability, greater state intervention is 
beneficial up to a point – but if the scope gets too interventionist for any given level of 
capability – the state’s effectiveness declines.  Effectiveness can be improved by 
reducing scope and increasing capability. 18This – two-part strategy for improving the 
effectiveness of the state was first laid out for large parts of the developing world in 
WDR 1997.  
 
17 I prefer the term capability to capacity – capability means capacity plus the ability to use that capacity. 
18 See Akram and Rath (2020) for evidence of state size and effectiveness. 
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India was hugely interventionist in 1990. For the sake of comparison, we show 
that broadly the degree of intervention of the Indian state is more than in Korea, but 
their capabilities are much higher. China’s state is more interventionist but also more 
capable. New Zealand carried out huge state reforms in the 1980’s and became much 
less interventionist but also far more capable (Figure 4). For India, the 1991 reforms 
meant that by 2020 the degree of state intervention declined to some extent, but the 
capability of the state had also declined – due to corruption, lack of administrative 
reforms and reduced competence To improve India’s state effectiveness, it must further 
reduce its degree of intervention and build up the capability of the state. Such a 
process will take a at least a decade up to 2030. 
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Figure 6: Direction of State Capability and Scope in India and Selected Countries  
 
                                    Source: Adapted from Fukuyama (2004) 
India underwent a phase of liberalization after the 1991 reforms but some 25 
years later the legacy of the public sector and government control remains large at the 
central and state level. Controls have shifted from licensing to regulatory bodies and a 
large public banking system remains allowing the business-politician nexus enormous 
power, patronage and opportunity to shift down -side risks to the taxpayer and derive 
huge profits on the upside.  
India is ready for a second set of reforms to unshackle India from state controls 
reduce the footprint of the state so that the government's slogan of “maximum 
governance; minimal government” can be realized. India has a public sector balance 
sheet with a large portfolio of public sector companies whose total assets exceed $500 
billion (18% of GDP). It must, over the next ten years, convert this balance sheet of 
capital in PSE's into a balance sheet of public infrastructure which can deliver services 
and crowd-in private investment for sustained long term growth and poverty 
eradication. We take this issue up in Section IV.  
But while reducing the scope of government is one phase of the reform, 
improving state capacity to perform vital functions must also be a key part of that 
reform. In many East Asian countries administrative reforms have been given as much 
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attention as economic reforms. There is no point in formulating great policies and 
policies, if you cannot implement them. China began its economic reforms in 1980 
under Deng Xiaoping, which allowed a market system to develop and the economy to 
start growing rapidly. Some 15 years later Premier Zhu Rongji carried out a sweeping 
reform of the bureaucracy and public administration to ensure that a more effective 
and smarter government emerged to meet China's new challenges. This helped China 
maintain the momentum to sustained growth for another two decades.  
India started its liberalization in 1991 with then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh 
as the principal architect of the reforms. This helped boost growth for two decades or 
so. But India missed the bus on administrative reforms when he was Prime Minister. Had 
India followed the Chinese pace it should have carried out such reforms in 2005-0619, 
the period of the UPA-I government, but coalition realities probably held it back from 
doing so. India certainly had another opportunity to do so again when UPA-II came 
back to power but did not take up the challenge. Perhaps it was distracted by the 
global crisis and perhaps administrative reforms are not politically easy for a 
democratically elected government, as it means giving up your own power. The 
bureaucracy finds hundreds of ways to stall such reforms – a big political push is 
needed, and their time frame would span at least a decade – too long for the electoral 
cycle.  
India is becoming a welfare state before becoming a developed state. The 
compulsions of its democratic system have forced it to address the problems of poverty 
with subsidies rather than more long-term sustainable solutions. As a result, India now 
spends almost 4 per cent of GDP on subsidies (almost as much as it spends on public 
education and health) - but also delivers them in a very ineffective manner with high 
leakages. Again, the contrast with China is striking which has addressed poverty by 
creating jobs and providing basic services - health, education, sanitation and not 
through subsidies. 
Even those emerging market economies that use subsidies have shifted away 
from product-based subsidies (food, fuel, fertilizer, etc.) to more people-based subsidies 
(cash transfers) to reduce costs and provide the poor more flexibility in their decision 
making. India must move in this direction, reduce its subsidy bill and release more 
resources for health, education, water and sanitation. 
IV. Dealing with the State-Owned Enterprises – Bharat’s Other Ratnas20 
We all know about “Bharat Ratna” India’s highest civilian award. Famous 
individuals like many of our independence fighters and more recent awardees like the 
great cricketer Sachin Tendulakar and the famous singer Lata Mangeshkar have 
received the Bharat Ratna. They are the venerated “Whose’ Who” of India. 
 
19 An administrative reforms commission (the second one after 1956) was established under Veerappa 
Moily in 2005 and it submitted a comprehensive report with over 1600 recommendations but very little 
was done.  
20 This section draws heavily on Chhibber (2018), Chhibber and Gupta (2017) 
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But there is surprisingly little debate on India’s other Ratnas — the more than 230 
public sector undertakings that were once the commanding heights of India’s 
socialistic economy and still account for about 20 per cent of the GDP and 15 per cent 
of stock market capitalization through 50 listed firms? Prime Minister Modi made a 
pledge to the US investors almost two years ago, which he repeated to German 
investors recently, that “the government has no business to do business”.  
India calls its state-owned enterprises public sector undertakings (PSU’s). Despite 
all the rhetoric, of privatization and reform India still has over 230 Central PSUs, of which 
seven are Maharatnas, 17 are Navratnas and more than 70 are Miniratnas — the crown 
jewels of India’s socialist legacy. There are also over 1,000 PSUs in state and municipal 
hands. It is time to clean up this costly legacy. But how to do this and what approach to 
take towards them is not so straightforward given the vast network of vested interests 
that are keen on their perpetuation. How did we create such a giant albatross is 
described in Chapter …? Here we examine what reforms have been undertaken so far 
and what India needs to do for a reset to the 21st century. 
The Declining Role of PSU’s in the Indian Economy  
Since the 1991 liberalization the role of PSUs has begun to decline, largely 
because the private sector has expanded rapidly. PSU share in employment in the 
organized labor force and its share of value added in GDP is now around 5 percent- 
down from 10% in 1990. But they still retain substantial assets: over 20% of GDP. Their 
share in manufacturing and mining has declined but remains significant.  
  About half of them are in manufacturing and mining and the rest are in service 
sector – transport, telecommunications, financial and technical services. Service 
sector PSU's are just over 100 while, non-service is around 130. There are over 1000 state 
level public sector enterprises (SLPE's), but they do not follow any classification system 
and are not all covered in a uniform manner across states. The combined assets of all 
PSU's was around 35% of GDP has declined to just over 20% of GDP 21 Over the same 
period the sales to GDP ratio declined from 20% of GDP in 1990 to about 14% of GDP : a 
much smaller decline indicating that the sales to asset ratio (also sometimes referred to 
as the turnover ratio) increased from 0.5 in 1990 to around 0.8 .   Value added created 
by PSU’s as a share of GDP and the ratio of PSU employment to total organized 
employment in the economy declined from around 8% of GDP in 1990 to under 5% of 
GDP. Post the 1991 liberalization although the number of PSU's has remained the same, 
their share in the economy measured by value added, employment and sales has 
declined, as the private sector has expanded faster. This is a pattern we see in several 
other countries with state capitalism such as in Brazil and China, where the share of 
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There have been very significant changes in the value added from PSU's in 
different sectors of the economy. PSU value-added share in mining has declined from 
80% in 1990 to less than 50% by 2003-04 and under 20% today. The share of PSUs in the 
service sector has remained low. In the manufacturing sector it declined from 20% in 
1990 to under 10% in 2004-5 but has surprisingly risen again in the last three years, mainly 
due to the oil and petroleum PSU’s, and those dealing with by products such as 
chemicals and fertilizers.22 
Combined, PSU’s make profits, but about 30% of them are serial loss makers23 
and the return on capital – except for the largest PSU's -is below that of comparable 
private firms. The losses alone would amount to around 10% of India's public 
infrastructure investment showing the opportunity cost of persisting with these 
enterprises in the state sector. Labor productivity in PSU's has grown at 2% per annum 
as against 5.2 % for the economy.24 
The PSU’s can be classified into 3 tiers: loss makers, profit makers and those that 
fluctuate between profit and loss and could potentially be turned around either 
through better performance in state hands or through disinvestment. PSUUs have gone 
through various types of restructuring and for various reasons. In some the purpose of 
the restructuring is to get the company ready for disinvestment (share sale) and listing in 
the stock market. In others, it is to stem the losses and in some it has been to try and turn 
loss makers into profitable companies. The restructuring story is very firm specific and 
cannot be summarized into any neat category.  
In addition to government equity some PSU's relied on soft loans from the 
government. These soft loans are in addition to their borrowing from the financial sector 
and international agencies. The soft loans have been criticized as they remove a hard 
budget constraint and allow inefficiency to persist and work against the objective of 
greater commercialization in the functioning of PSU's.  
Surprisingly such soft loans continued to rise even after the 1991 liberalization25. 
Some of these loans were paid back but in many cases were delinquent and were 
written off and some turned into equity. The government was keeping a lifeline to loss 
makers through these soft loans, while at the same time trying to get them to improve 
sending very conflicting signals.  
 
22 The PSU's which have shown biggest improvements in value added in the last three years are: Bharat 
Electronics Ltd, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Hindustan 
Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, Numaligarh Refinery Ltd, Rashtriya Chemicals & 
Fertilizers Ltd, Steel Authority of India Ltd 
23 These figures do not include the contribution of the state level PSU's for which a centralized data base 
does not exist. Their contribution varies widely. In 2015-16, for example, in Assam sales to GDP was just 
over 2% of state GDP whereas in Punjab it was around 13% of state GDP. 
24 This does not include the SLPE's, but given their much poorer performance, lack of any established 
skills development and training programs their growth in labor productivity is likely to be even lower.  
25 See Chhibber and Gupta (2018) for a fuller discussion on soft loans to PSU’s.  
T 
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The larger PSU's appear to be doing even better than private companies of 
similar size, based on their reported data. For example, the return-on-assets and return-
on-capital in the largest 7 PSUs - Maharatna's appears to be better than firms in the 
private sector and in FDI-based companies of similar size,  though the value of assets, 
especially land, needs careful scrutiny.26 Independent audits are needed to assess their 
performance. But in the case of the next category of PSU's -the 17 Navratna's, the 
performance of the private firms of similar size is much better, except for the better 
performance of the Navratna's over their private sector comparators during the period 
of high growth from 2003-4  to around 2008-9. It is also interesting that the returns on 
both assets and on capital for the Navratnas went up during the period of rapid growth 
and has declined quite sharply since the global economic crisis.   
 
PSU’s in the service sectors, such as Air India, MTNL and BSNL, and those 
providing a range of other types of services both financial and nonfinancial have done 
poorly relative to those in mining and manufacturing. This is also not surprising, given the 
lack of service orientation in PSUs. Not only is the performance of PSU's in the service 
sectors worse but their presence could have also adversely affected the performance 
of private sector firms in those sectors. This is because the government introduces 
regulation and preferred policies to favor PSU's get a better deal than the private 
competition in that sector.  Mukherjee (2015) stated that in service sectors with erstwhile 
public monopolies, the vested interest of the government and PSUs adversely affect 
the performance of the entire sector.27    
PSU's have also under-performed on various productivity indicators used to 
measure firm performance. Profit before interest, taxes per employee (PBITE) and Net 
sales per employee (NSE) have increased five-fold and value-added per employee 
(VAE) has increased four-fold respectively between 1990 and 2019 .But labor 
productivity in PSU's – measured by Value-added per employee increased 
considerably slower at 2% per annum, than average labor productivity growth of 
 
26 The main issue is whether land owned by these PSU's is entered at book value or market value. In the 
latter case the picture on their financial performance could look different. 
27 This is probably a bigger issue in the airline sector than in the telecommunication sector. The 
presence of PSUs in the telecom sector has not had a negative effect on the industry because of a more 
effective regulatory environment, has not hindered private sector companies. TRAI the 
telecommunication regulator has had its share of criticism, but it has not been accused of helping PSU's 
against the private sector27. But in aviation, the Director General of Civil Aviation DGCA has not worked 
as effectively in creating a level playing field and has favored Air-India. It has deliberately or 
unconsciously affected the performance of private sector airlines. But service sector private companies 
have also performed poorly for a variety of other reasons.  
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around 5.2 % for the economy as a whole (including low productivity sector such as 
agriculture) over the same period. 
A major objective in setting up PSU's was to increase employment and this 
objective was pursued vigorously. Between 1970 and 1990 employment in PSU's almost 
doubled from 1.1 million in 1970 to almost 2 million in 1990 (around 10% of the organized 
labor force). The objective was not only to create more jobs but also to improve the 
skills base of the labor force. This was to be done by a focus on skills development, 
training and HRD. At the same time PSU's were also told to give special preference to 
Scheduled Class (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST).   
In summary there was, and probably still exists considerable over-employment in 
the PSU's. Their total employment which had reached a peak of 2 million employees in 
the central PSU's is now only 1.25 million employees for about the same number of 
firms. This would suggest that under the guise of job creation over-employment of 
around 60% existed in the PSU's. Some of this has now been corrected and the 
remaining work force is given better training and skills development. But despite these 
efforts at improving the skills of PSU employees the growth in labor productivity in PSU’s 
is much below than that of the economy. 
 
Efforts to Reform and Privatize PSU’s since 1991 
While privatization of PSU's was not part of the liberalization package of the 1991 
reforms, efforts to try and improve their performance was. It was too big and messy an 
issue to tackle during a crisis and in any case the first stage reforms were primarily 
designed to liberalize trade and markets. But some change was envisaged even in the 
way the state managed its enterprises Greater delegation of decision making, more 
commercialization for profitable PSUs and, restructuring of loss-making firms through the 
Bureau of Industrial Financing and Restructuring were included. Other elements of the 
liberalization involved: i) Free entry to private sector firms in industries reserved 
exclusively for PSUs; ii) Disinvestment of a small part of the government's shareholding 
(while still holding majority stocks) and listing PSUs on the stock exchanges. The most 
significant of industries affected by the former policy were telecommunications, 
petroleum (from extraction to refining and marketing), electricity generation and 
distribution, several basic goods industries like steel, aluminum, mining, and air 
transportation. And for the latter, ensuring that the listed PSUs follow the stock 
exchanges' listing requirements necessitated disclosure and governance regulations, 
appointment of independent directors, independent remuneration and audit 
committees. Withholding or withdrawing budgetary support to loss-making('sick') PSUs. 
Subsequently, sick PSUs were denied permission to revise wages and salaries. Loss 
making PSU's were to be encouraged to lay off workers to seek commercial viability, 
failing which, they were to be closed.  
But between 1992 and 1998, privatization was not pursued aggressively as there 
was no strong pressure brought on India externally or internally to do that. The IMF did 
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not insist on this as part of its financial conditionality and strong labor unions ensured 
that the political costs of privatization would be high. Strong political and vested 
interests and deep-seated bureaucratic preference for PSU's where jobs could be had 
made sure there was no strong internal constituency for privatization. The Board of 
Industrial Financing and Restructuring (BIFR) was created to track performance of PSU's 
and advise them- especially the sick ones- on investment and restructuring. Three 
categories of PSU's were formed and named; Maharatna's, Navratna's, 3 4 and Mini 
Ratna's, and performance contract (MOU's) were signed with them to create incentives 
for better performance.  
The NDA government under PM Vajpayee that came to power in 1999, was the 
first one that followed an aggressive privatization policy but faced political and 
bureaucratic hurdles. A separate Ministry of Disinvestment was created in 199928 -and 
the objective of disinvestment under it was not just to raise revenue but also improve 
efficiency. Over 30 companies were either fully privatized or 50 per cent of their stock 
divested, including one of India's most successful privatization initiatives - the sale of 
Maruti to Suzuki was completed during this period. Arun Shourie the then Minister for 
Disinvestment described it well when he stated, "these are not the crown jewels 
(Ratnas) of India's economy but bleeding ulcers". Under him, privatization which in India 
is euphemistically called "strategic disinvestment" was pursued with determination but 
opposition was faced especially from labor unions who had extracted many 
concessions from the government. But opposition came even from within the NDA 
government and the bureaucracy as the control over PSU's meant jobs, patronage, 
and the ability to make money through PSU contracts.  
The UPA 1 government which came to power in 2004, dependent on the 
communists, did not try to privatize PSUs - although, a few were shut down. Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh explained his constraints quite clearly, "We are a coalition 
government, and that limits our options in some ways. Privatization happens to be one 
such area.” It instead encouraged restructuring of state-owned firms by creating the 
Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector Enterprises (BRSPE) to advise the Government 
on the strategies, measures and schemes related to strengthening, modernizing, 
reviving, and restructuring of public sector enterprises.. A National Investment Fund was 
also created to collect disinvestment receipts, with the idea that it would be 
strategically deployed rather than used as part of budget receipts. Following fiscal 
pressures after the 2008-2009 crisis, the criterion was gradually relaxed until the fund, for 
all practical purposes, became part of the budget.  
UPA 2 from 2009-2014 pursued aggressive disinvestment (share sales) – not 
privatization. Its main objective was to raise revenue for the budget: not with any intent 
to improve performance although that may have turned out to be its unintended 
 
28 Earlier it was a department of the finance ministry. The subsequent UPA government’s once again 
abolished the ministry and the NDA government under Modi has pushed privatization but has not created 
a separate ministry to carry it out , presumably because there was so much opposition to that ministry 
when it was created by PM Vajpayee and headed by Arun Shourie.  
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outcome, as firms were prepared for listing in the stock market. With the arrival of the 
NDA government again in 2014 there was an expectation that the disinvestment 
pursued quite aggressively by NDA1 between 1999 and 2004 would be taken up again 
and while not much has happened in the first term so far there are signals that more 
effort will be made in the second term. The government has announced a list of PSUs 
for closure and for privatization including Air India, but it remains to be seen how much 
progress will be made on this front. With COVID-19 the plans for privatization have in 
any case had to be delayed – but are expected to resume in post-COVID as 
government needs revenue and there are powerful corporate interests wanting to buy 
these assets.  
What does the evidence on PSU (State Owned Enterprises) performance 
tell us?  
There are a vast number of studies PSU’s (state enterprises) around the world. 
Many of them show that privatization improves labor productivity and even profitability 
of PSU's but not necessarily overall efficiency and productivity. A comprehensive survey 
of this literature (Megginson and Netter, 2001) concluded that divested (fully and 
partially privatized) firms almost always become more profitable and more efficient. An 
OECD survey soon thereafter also came to the same conclusion. Subsequent surveys 
(Muhlenkamp, 2013) have questioned these findings and shown that the previous 
survey suffered from flaws. It questions whether privatization leads to greater efficiency 
and argue that public and private sector firms perform the same when subject to 
competition and better regulation. Some have argued that many of the studies suffer 
from methodological flaws as the gains from privatization maybe due to selection bias – 
as better performing PSU's maybe privatized first.  
             The most recent survey by UNDP's Global Centre for Public Service Excellence 
(GSCPE, 2017), shows that privatization is likely to lead to positive results in markets with 
greater competition and better regulation. This is more likely in developed countries but 
not so in middle income and developing economies, where the results of privatization 
are more mixed. Factors affecting PSU performance can be economy wide variables - 
GDP growth rate, sector or industry specific variables including concentration of firms, 
size of the firm, export orientation, capital intensity to name some of the most important 
ones. In addition, the share of private equity (degree of privatization) and performance 
contracts29 can also potentially affect firm performance by encouraging 
commercialization, reducing political interference and giving the PSU management 
clearer performance goals and targets and pay and other incentives for improved 
performance.  
There is some empirical evidence that performance contracts can improve PSU 
performance (Shirley and Xu, 1998). There are many studies that try and discuss the 
performance of PSU's in the Indian context. But very few of these use rigorous 
techniques and are therefore largely descriptive (Arun and Nixson, 2000; Mathur, 2010; 
 
29 In India we call performance contract between government and a PSU Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  
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Nagaraj, 2005 and Trivedi, 1990). When we look at the more rigorous one’s we get some 
interesting findings.   
In a recent paper, (Jain, 2016) uses technical efficiency of the firm as the 
performance variable, instead of financial rates of return. She applies a stochastic 
frontier analysis technique to generate technical efficiency by industry and by firm and 
then examines the impact of disinvestment and the ideology of the state government 
in which the enterprise is located as well as whether the state government belongs to a 
political party that is different from the central government. The results indicate that 
disinvestment - even partial disinvestment - has a strong positive effect on firm 
performance. The political ideology of the state government as well as whether the 
state government and the central government belong to different parties has a 
significant effect on performance. Her results are however dependent on the credibility 
of the method used to calculate technical efficiency, which is derived as a residual in 
the stochastic frontier analysis and is therefore dependent on how well specified the 
model is itself. 
 (Gupta, 2006) showed that disinvestment (even the sale of minority shares) had 
a positive effect on PSU financial performance, ostensibly because new owners 
injected greater commercial drive, which helped improve profitability. Gupta (2011) 
focused on the evaluation of performance of the PSU’s based on data of 213 
manufacturing and non-financial service sector firms from CMIE (Centre of Monitoring 
the Indian Economy) for the period 1988- 2009. This paper supported the fact that the 
sale of both partial and majority equity stake accompanied by the transfer of 
management control from government to private owners has economically significant 
positive impact on performance of PSUs. The paper also considered the impact of the 
disinvestment on the compensation of employees and employment and shows that the 
improvement in profitability following privatization is not accompanied by a decline in 
worker compensation and employment, after controlling for observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the firms such as firm size, industry Herfindahl index and 
year dummies to control for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. The paper did 
not look at all at the role of performance contracts (MOU's) and focused entirely on the 
role of disinvestment. It was also using data from the period largely before the new 
improved MOU's were introduced.  
But this result has been challenged by recent studies as it did not factor in the 
effect of performance contracts - MOU's. Gunasekar and Sarkar (2014) show that when 
PSU’s with and without MOUs are considered, much of the financial performance 
improvement using Return on Assets (ROC) - attributed to privatization is due to the 
performance effect of MOU's. The positive effect of privatization disappears once the 
MOU performance effect is considered. So, a policy of selling a minority stake (up to 49 
per cent) as a disinvestment measure is unlikely to have any positive effect on financial 
performance. In their first paper (Chhibber and Gupta, 2018) had analyzed the 
financial performance of India's 235 PSU’s using firm level data over the period 1990-
2015 from the Public Enterprise Survey (time series panel data set). The paper 
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investigated factors that explain the financial performance - return on capital (ROC) 
and return on assets (ROA) of these PSU’s. The results did show a positive effect of MOU's 
on their return on capital (ROC), but not on return to assets (ROA) as was shown in the 
Gunasekar and Sarkar paper.  
However, this result, holds only for the non-service sector (manufacturing, mining) 
but not for service sector firms. In the case of service sector firms, divestment (share 
sales) had a positive impact on performance, making them ideal candidates for more 
aggressive privatization. The results also show that larger PSU's -Maharatna's appear to 
perform better on financial indicators than smaller PSU's and even better than private 
firms of similar size. GDP growth has as expected a positive effect on PSU performance 
and soft loans have a negative effect as they reduce the pressure on firm 
performance. Export orientation and capital intensity have no clear effect on PSU 
performance.  
In a subsequent paper (Chhibber and Gupta 2019) the focus is on explaining the 
factors affecting the efficiency and productivity of India's PSUs using various measures 
of productivity, instead of financial indicators. In this paper, value added per employee 
is used as a measure of labour productivity and value added per capital and value 
added per asset to measure productive use of capital and assets. 30The results show 
that MOU - performance contracts - have no positive and sometimes negative effect 
on performance. The results provide very clear support for share sales (divestment) and 
privatization (strategic divestment) as opposed to performance contracts (MOUs) to 
improve the performance of PSU's. They also indicate that MOU's are not producing the 
results for which it was designed. There is also the possibility that PSU's only agree to 
benchmarks which are easily achievable and are gaming the MOU system. They have 
a cozy relationship with their sectoral ministry and can use that relationship to ensure 
high MOU ratings even when their productivity parameters are low or even declining.  
Performance of CPSU's After Strategic Disinvestment (Outright Privatization) 
 In addition to partial share sales (divestment) India also had a unique 
experiment with full privatization (strategic disinvestment) during the period of the NDA 
1 government from 1999 to 2004.What does the evidence on the performance of PSUs 
that underwent strategic disinvestment tell us? Some 30 entities were strategically 
disinvested during that period. Of these, 23 several were hotels, sold largely for their 
land and assets. Some PSUs were sold to other PSUs, and therefore did not really pass 
into private hands. Twelve companies were fully privatized between 1999 and 2004 
under the NDA1 government-where over 50 per cent of their shares and management 
control passed into private hands- ceding management control to the private sector.  
 
30 The model used ensures correction for self-selection by estimating the results with and without MOU's 
and with and without disinvestment creating six different samples of firms. The results are therefore done 
separately for firms without MOU or disinvestment, with disinvestment only, with MOU only and with firms 
that have both MOU and disinvestment. 
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The performance of these 12 PSUs- Bharat Aluminum, CMC, Hindustan 
Teleprinters, Hindustan Zinc, HTL, ICI India, Indian Petrochemicals, Jessop and Co, Lagan 
Jute Mills, Maruti Udyog, Modern Food Industries, Paradeep Phosphates and Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam shows considerable improvements after strategic disinvestment. The 
weighted return on capital (ROC)tripled on average from around 5 per cent in 1999-
2004 to 15.1 per cent in 2010-2015 and went even higher in the high growth phase 2004- 
2009 to average around 25%. The ROA for these firms also stays high - higher than those 
of the Navratnas that remained in public hands. It also jumps up in the high growth 
phase and remains over 15% in the period 2010-2015 - of course it was also high in the 
period 1999-2004. 
The experience of privatization undertaken by the NDA 1 government from 1999 
to 2004 has turned out to be quite positive. The results provide very clear support for 
share sales (divestment) and privatization (strategic divestment) as opposed to 
performance contracts (MOUs) to improve the performance of PSU's.31 
                Getting Government Out of the Business of Business 
India needs a 10-year plan for reform of the PSU's instead of the piece-meal 
annual announcements of closure, privatization, divestiture followed so far. For now, it 
should keep the Maharatna's in the public sector but try to make them world class 
companies. For the others with few exceptions the ten-year plan should include their 
sale or closure. The plan could have two phases of 5 years each; with Phase 1 focused 
on PSU's that require closure and those in mining, manufacturing, and services where 
outright sales do not require other sectoral reforms. Phase 2 could be reserved for PSU's 
where other reforms are needed to provide alternates to citizens for services currently 
provided by PSU's. 
The Maharatnas in state hands-whose total assets are around Rs 10 trillion ($133 
billion), about one-third of total PSU assets of about Rs 30 trillion ($500 billion). In any 
case, the Maharatnas-BHEL, Coal India, GAIL, Indian Oil, NTPC, ONGC and SAIL-are 
collectively doing better than private companies of similar size. Their return on capital 
and return on assets have been higher than those of comparable private firms by 4% 
and 2%, respectively. However, even in this category the situation has seen a reversal of 
trends in the last three years; the private sector has shown a surprising improvement in 
return on capital and return on assets while the Maharatnas are showing a continuous 
decline in performance. Therefore, among the Maharatnas, SAIL, BHEL and Indian Oil 
need serious restructuring and better leadership to make them world-class companies.  
The remaining two-thirds of state assets are in the 17 Navratnas,73 Miniratnas and 
120 odd companies that are not given a Ratna status. The performance of the 17 
Navratnas is consistently worse than that of comparable private companies, with return 
 
31 It is of course possible that there was a selection bias in that better performing PSU's were selected for 
strategic disinvestment (privatization). 
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on capital roughly 2% lower. Many of the companies in this group could be privatized in 
Phase 1-especially Bharat Electronics, MTNL, NMDC and Oil India.  
The category of Miniratna is formed by 73 companies, and these are the ones 
that are most ripe for strategic disinvestment in Phase 1. A plan to sell most of these 
companies should be developed, with those in manufacturing and the services sector 
high on the list for immediate sale as these are the worst performers. There will be many 
arguments made against selling these companies to the private sector, but there seems 
to be no reason to run these as public companies except to provide employment to a 
small number of people and to be able to provide managerial positions to party 
members once any new government comes into power. A far more serious issue is that 
of tainted contracts and procurement, where lucrative deals are handed out to 
cronies. 
 It is often argued that PSU's should be prepared for privatization through 
restructuring prior to the sale. But it is not evident that such restructurings are helpful or 
get higher valuations. The buyer may or may not value any of these restructurings and 
may have very different ideas of how to improve the company. So operational 
restructuring is often not advisable. On the other hand, financial restructuring may be 
needed for many PSU's as they often have a web of complicated financial relationships 
or like Air India are saddled with large debt.  
But even for those that appear at first blush to be indispensable India needs a 
long-term plan to look for alternative ways to serve national and consumer interest. For 
example, it will be argued that the Food Corporation of India (FCI) is needed for India's 
food policy objectives. But if India reforms its food policy and allows private traders to 
play a much bigger role in the purchase, storage and sale of food (along the lines of 
the Shanta Kumar Committee Report, 2016) the FCI could be run as a small non-profit 
agency. Poor consumers could be provided cash transfers instead of the elaborate 
system of fair price shops. Mexico provides a good example of how it got rid of a costly 
state-owned enterprise CONASUPO over a ten-year period and replaced it with a well-
run cash transfer system called PROCAMPO.  
However, such huge changes in the entire food marketing chain will take time 
and cannot be done overnight. But without a clear plan on where India needs to be 10 
years from now it is hard to make any change at all. The same logic applies to India's 
numerous fertilizer PSU's. Farmers (especially small farmers) should be paid a cash 
subsidy to help them purchase fertilizers and other inputs. But the private sector should 
gradually take over the production and distribution of fertilizers and get the numerous 
fertilizer PSU's out of the system altogether. Again Mexico (through its PROGRESSA 
program) and later Turkey were able to make this transformation with huge savings to 
the budget. 32 
 
32 At the state level more than half the SLPEs should be shut down. In fact, over 300 of the registered 
companies are “non-working” and should be wound down immediately. There is no reason to keep them 
open; other than the state does not know what to do with employees who are part of the payroll of these 
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There is a case to keep some of the power and oil companies in public hands at 
least in the first phase. For example, the Power Grid Corporation33 could remain in 
government hands until complete unbundling has occurred in the power sector after 
which it too could go into private hands. Some of the oil companies could also for now 
remain in government control until fuel prices are liberalized and brought under the 
GST. There was a case earlier for defense-related PSU's on security grounds- such as 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). That case may yet exist but with the government 
opening the defense sector to private investment and consciously encouraging the 
private sector to enter this excluded area the case for defense sector PSU's becomes 
weaker. It may in any case help bring in foreign partners into these companies to 
upgrade their technology and make them more cost conscious. But even in the 
security area the case for PSU's is now much weaker and even these could be under 
plans for privatization in Phase 2.  
How and to whom these companies are sold does matter. Russian-style or Latin 
America style privatization-where most of state assets were sold to "oligarchs"- must be 
avoided.34 Transparent processes, competitive bidding and ensuring that some of the 
funds are set aside for worker compensation are vital for strategic disinvestment to 
succeed. Strategic sales are considered the optimal way to get the best returns from 
privatization, but this need not be so. In democratic countries with reasonably 
developed capital markets, open market sales (share sales) could be designed to 
widen ownership and create a greater public stake for the sales. India now has many 
large well-functioning private companies with professional management and are not 
family owned. Employees could also be provided shares – employee stock option plans 
(ESOPs) in the privately managed companies so that they are not so resistant to the sale 
and share in the upside post-privatization.  
For companies that are already listed the concern that such large block sales will 
lower their share price can be countered by call-auctions and pre-announced share 
sales in smaller chunks over time. FII's could be allowed to purchase shares so that there 
would be no need to list these companies in international stock exchanges. They could 
be listed in the National Stock Exchange or the Mumbai Stock Exchange – which are 
now experienced enough to handle such sales- but with FII access the market for these 
shares would be wider. The opposition to such an approach will come from trade 
unions, vested interests and even consumers afraid of higher prices. But considering the 
 
companies. But despite repeated admonitions by the CAG these have not been closed. But even among 
the “functioning PSU's” there are many loss-making companies that have outlived their usefulness and 
are candidates for closure. A centralized account should be created to know the full financial picture of all 
remaining SLPE's just as has been done for the CPSU’s. A dividend policy should be enforced so that 
profit making SLPE's provide a return to the taxpayer. Privatization should be pushed for those in the 
mining and manufacturing sector and much greater commercialization for the service PSU's in water, 
electricity distribution and in transport. 
33 Partial share sales in it have improved its performance.  
34 There is a strong risk that in India’s “Billionaire Raj” privatization will allow large corporate interests to 
grab these assets.  
 
Copyright Ajay Chhibber 2021 25 
long-term benefits to the economy and better services and products to the consumer, 
this approach is worth exploring.  
Without such a bold approach we will perhaps see some temporary 
improvements in some PSU's but the underlying incentives for better performance will 
not have changed and future politicians will have the opportunity to misuse them, 
again. The PPP program needs a major overhaul along the lines of the Kelkar 
committee recommendations. Banks are not the best place to seek long term finance 
for PPP projects and efforts must be made to develop non-bank financial sources: the 
bond market, insurance and pension funds going directly to finance such projects. And 
the banking sector itself needs a dose of privatization.  
In order to avoid the charge that the government is selling the family silver to so 
to speak pay the grocer's bill – the proceeds from the privatization and sales of assets of 
closed firms should not go back into the budget but instead should be put into the 
National Infrastructure Investment Fund and used to pay worker compensation so that 
the people can visibly identify how the proceeds are being utilized. Such an approach 
also follows the best practices of the IMF's fiscal rules which have inexplicably been 
eroded in India and even the IMF has acquiesced in this relaxation of the fiscal rules for 
India.  
It is time to make the slogan “The Business of Government is not Business” a 
reality. Just kicking the can down the road again and again will not work. A litmus test 
would be the sale of Air-India.  
 
V. Re-strengthening the State to Deliver  
“….  reforming an existing order is one of the most dangerous and difficult things…Those who 
benefited from the old order will resist change very fiercely. By contrast, those who can benefit 
from the new order will be less fierce in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar, and 
they are not certain it will live up to its promises” Nicolo Machiavelli 
 
A major puzzle in India the government appears to do a few things well but its 
ability to provide basic services across the board remains very weak. India has a 
competent central bank – the RBI, has an Election Commission that can run elections as 
well if not better than any other democratic country, has a space agency ISRO that 
can launch satellites cheaper than anyone else. But India seems unable to deliver basic 
education, provide primary health care and water and sanitation. In this India is not 
unique in the developing world, but some have solved this problem. Many East Asian 
countries like Taiwan, China, Korea and now Vietnam were able to do this through well 
monitored competent bureaucracies. Some like Bangladesh have managed – despite 
incompetent and corrupt bureaucracy, by allowing NGO’s to deliver these services.  
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Arturo Israel35 provides a useful way of thinking through this problem by a dual 
classification of service delivery – specificity (or discretion)36 and transaction volume.  
Figure 7: Classifying Government Activities by Specificity and Transaction 
Volume 
 
                        Source: Adapted from Israel (1987)  
Figure 7 provides an illustration for India using Israel’s classification. Government 
functions are classified into 4 quadrants – based on the specificity of the tasks they 
perform and transactions volume. The RBI37, ISRO and the Election Commission perform 
very specific tasks with considerable discretion, - they have high specificity and low 
volume of transactions. At the opposite end are services that have large volume of 
transactions – but lack specificity – in the sense that it is difficult to measure 
performance and/or ascribe it to a specific input. Low scores in the school system could 
 
35 Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance (World Bank) 1987 by Arturo Israel   
 
36 Woolcock and Pritchett (2017) changed the Israel terminology from specificity to discretion. But here 
we stick to the Israel terminology and use specificity. Kelkar and Shah (2019) add two other elements to 
this terminology- stake and secrecy. These maybe relevant as well in some circumstances but broadly the 
two elements identified by Israel suffice.  
37 The RBI has a specific task – setting its interest rates – which is now done through the MPC. Whether it 
does this well is a matter of judgement but it’s very specific. Less specific is its regulation of the banking 
system – where how to judge its performance is not that easy. What yardstick to use – India has not had 
a full-blown banking crisis but rising NPA’s and scams have indicated a growing problem in the banking 
system.  
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be due to poor administration, bad teaching, lack of educational supplies or even poor 
nutrition for the children. The same applies in even greater measure to health, where 
poor health outcomes could be due to a variety of factors and the most important 
ones, such as water and sanitation, mother’s education may not even be in the health 
sector. The same problem also afflicts the police and the judiciary – where transaction 
volume is sufficiently large and specificity also low – although perhaps not as much as in 
health.  
The volume of transactions is less in higher education or tertiary education in 
Quadrant 3, but they also suffer from lower specificity – except for some elite institutions.  
Railways, electricity providers, telecommunications providers are in Quadrant 2 where 
they have high specificity – measures of performance but have high transactions 
volume. Such services are best commercialized or provided by the private sector, as far 
as possible. In electricity, for example generation and distribution could be in private 
hands with transmission in a semi-public agency. Rail lines could be in the public sector 
but wagons, catering etc. could all be in private hands. 
 Agencies in Quadrant 1 perform better whereas those in Quadrant IV are the 
most difficult to deliver as they lack specificity (are hard to measure performance and 
ascribe it to a factor) and have high transactions volume. So central banking, or 
rocketry, or running an election are very specific tasks and when run by agencies that 
are given considerable discretion in their decision making can be run very effectively. 
School teaching or primary health care are high volume transactions with little 
specificity. The education and health outcomes are dependent on many things of 
which the effectiveness of the teacher or the primary health care worker are only one 
part and often not the most important part. You have lack of specificity (discretion) and 
large volume making accountability very difficult. Higher education has more 
specificity – so India can run a few IIT’s and IIM’s reasonably well – but even here a mass 
of higher education institutions – can exist basically providing degrees but no skills.  
It also explains why government’s are keen to deliver things like toilets, water, gas 
cylinders, bank accounts – where they can show the beneficiary immediate results but 
do not show the same interest in delivering the more difficult services like health and 
education which may have much better long-term development outcomes. This new 
welfarism38 helps win elections but not development.  
Aircraft maintenance, airports, ports, highway maintenance, commercial 
banking have some specificity and larger volumes of transactions than a central bank, 
or an election commission, but if interfered with by political masters can also 
deteriorate quickly. Courts have specificity but even larger transactions than these 
agencies and enormous opportunity for corruption as the Indian system shows. 
Transparency through IT is one solution where discretion in decision making is not 
needed. So, payment of taxes, electricity and water utility, registration of property etc. 
 
38 See Anand, Dimble and Subramanian (2021) for a discussion on this new welfarism. But this type of welfarism 
has prevailed in India in the past as well. In many states local leaders have distributed such welfarism to win 
elections. What may be new is that India’s central government has now made it more widespread and national.  
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can be digitized with huge improvement in service – and post pandemic this shift will 
increase hugely.  
What this means is that services like basic health and education – must be 
localized, with some overall guidelines and regulations. Local governments do this well 
in some states like Kerala , but there is a risk that in some states such as Bihar and UP 
local elites will control the hiring of teachers and primary health workers and turn these 
into jobs for their friends and family and their supporters. NGO’s could be another 
option as in Bangladesh and NGO’s like Pratham are already highlighting the problems 
in India’s education system. Local property taxation to fund these services will also 
provide greater ownership and control over the provision of these services – which lack 
specificity and have a high volume of transactions. Corporatization, or private provision 
of a range of services with appropriate regulation is another option. 
Telecommunications and transport are already moving in this direction. Much of India’s 
electricity sector could also be privatized.  
Figure 8: Trust in State Institutions India 2019 
 
Source Politics and Society Between Elections 2019 CSDS (Lokniti)  
Reform of the state is not an easy process – especially in a democratic set-up 
with a five-year electoral cycle. It’s a long-term project and may need decades of 
reform. Resistance builds up very quickly from those who will lose out and as Machiavelli 
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says it very accurately – the support from the beneficiaries is scattered and weak. Many 
countries carried out such reforms after war and conflict when state administrations 
were re-built.  It is important therefore to start with some priorities and take on 
something achievable – but does require strong leadership and mobilization of citizen 
support.  
One way to prioritize state reform is to assess how citizens view the state and its 
various branches.  A poll carried out just before the 2019 elections by CSDS, Lokniti and 
Azim Premji University39 showed that the army and the courts remain the most trusted as 
well as the District Collector, the official responsible for state administration at the district 
level, and much higher than the Chief Minister of each state(province) and even the 
Prime Minister(Figure 8). The high trust in the judiciary is surprising given the high level of 
judicial corruption and the huge backlog of cases – whereby justice is denied for so 
long.  The police, government officials in general (other than the district collector) get 
low marks on trust and the least trusted are political parties.  
Broadly, among the three branches of government the judiciary gets the highest 
marks, the legislative bodies are second and the administrative branch of government 
is the least trusted. Political parties are in the complete doghouse as per this survey and 
the new laws that allow donors to buy electoral bonds without divulging their identity 
allows electoral funding to be used to buy favors legally without any scrutiny from the 
election commission. Based on this an administrative reform of government would be a 
good place to start, given how difficult it will be to do election funding reform. 
India’s Boutique Government – Small in Size but Hugely Expensive  
The size of the civil service is by itself not large, but its composition needs a huge 
restructuring - too many clerical and administrative staff and too few technocratic 
experts, teachers, and health workers. Kapur (2020) argues that the size of the state is 
small because it has too few judges, police officers, teachers, doctors etc. That is 
probably true – as the share of general government employment to total employment 
was around 1% - the lowest in Asia in the 1990’s (Schiavo-Campo, Tommaso and 
Mukherjee (1998) and has not changed much since then.  In most Asian countries its 
above 2%, and in Malaysia and Srilanka over 3%.40 On the other hand, the small size 
comes with a very heavy cost. In India the average wage of a general government 
employee to GDP per capita is around 7 – amongst the highest in the world , whereas 
in most of Asia that ratio lies between 1 ( Vietnam , China)  and  2.5 ( Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Philippines). Even Korea, Thaland and Malaysia have a ratio of general 
government wage to per capita GDP of around 3-4. With a ratio of 7 India is in the 
category of some former -French ruled African countries like Senegal. In much of the 
Arab world and Turkey that ratio is around 2-3.   These ratios need updating, but they 
probably have not changed much and if anything, have probably worsened – in that 
government salaries especially after the last pay commission have gone even higher 
 
39 POLITICS and SOCIETY between ELECTIONS 2019 Survey Report by CSDS, Lokniti and Azim Premji 
University.  
40 See Salvatore Schiavo-Campo Giulio de Tommaso Amitabha Mukherjee 1998.  
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and government employment as share of total employment has gone even lower – 
despite large increases in employment in railways and police. India runs a boutique 
government – small relative to its needs but very expensive relative to its income.  
At the apex of this bureaucracy sits a mandarin-like elite administrative service 
who are competent and smart but who are shuffled around like a deck of cards at a 
bridge game and therefore have no time to develop the in-depth expertise needed to 
remain abreast of global developments in those fields. They lack the technical edge 
required to lead India's government policy in their sectors to retain our competitive 
edge and they often suffer from excessive political interference in their functioning. A 
more professional, performance-based civil service with promotions based on regular 
testing rather than a time-bound lifelong sinecure is needed to maintain a meritocratic 
culture. There is much to learn from the civil service systems of East Asian countries such 
as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan41. Much greater specialization is also needed 
at the top of the bureaucracy – instead of the generalist model India adopted from its 
colonial administrative system. 42 
Another factor that has contributed to huge inefficiencies in the civil services is 
the compression ratio- the ratio of average salaries in the highest to lowest bracket. 
India’s wage compression ratio declined considerably. This has come about by keeping 
salaries of the top low and increasing rapidly salaries at the lower end of the 
bureaucracy. The 7th Pay Commission defined the compression ratio as the ratio of the 
entry level employee at Grade A to C at 3.12 and for the ratio of the highest paid at 
Grade a to Grade c at 3.74. The upper end of the civil service has seen its real wages 
fall well below that of the private sector, whereas at the lower end salaries (including 
benefits) can be more secure and are even higher than in the private sector.43 This has 
meant that the pay and as a result the quality of the inductees at the higher end – with 
discretionary decision-making authority has declined, whereas those at the lower end – 
that make up more than 90% of the government labor force end up paid a much 
higher wage than the private sector and what the labour market delivers. India spends 
too much on its government as it pays too high a salary at many lower levels of 
government and ends up having too few government teachers, health workers, 
policemen and judges.  
 
41 See Hyung-Ki Kim (1995) “The Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development: Lessons for Policy 
Makers from Other Countries” in Hyung-Ki Kim, M. Muramatsu, T.J. Pempel and K Yamamura The 
Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development Catalysts of Change Clarendon Press, Oxford.  
 
42Kapur (2020) makes the case that India’s civil administration is not based on patronage because there 
are so many vacancies. Many of those exist because of lack of funds. The main issue is lack of 
motivation and stagnation as there is no performance- based evaluation system. People are promoted 
based on years of service, except at the very end.  
43 See Sonalde Desai (2015) in the Hindu October 2015 an unjustified pay-hike Desai shows that at every 
level of education public sector wage in India are higher than in the private sector. She writes “The CPC 
found that compensation to Group C and D employees in government was higher than that in the private 
sector; for Group B it was similar and only for Group A was it lower. Group A employees form less than 5 
per cent of the total Central government workforce; Group C and D are about 90 per cent.” 
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However, that just means India’s public spend which is quite large is spent badly. 
It does not mean India should increase government spending but re-orient its spending 
better. Almost 50% of total governmental expenditure is non-developmental – with 
large chunks going to defense, pensions, and interest payments. India also spends too 
much at central and state levels and very little (3%) at the local administration level. The 
same amount spent at the local level would allow it to hire many more teachers or 
nurses and compounders as local wages are much lower than those determined at 
state capitals or at the centre in New Delhi.  
The new bureaucratic elite are the regulatory bodies - often headed by retired 
senior government officials, not by technically competent experts as is the case in most 
other parts of the world. We need a blueprint of a modern regulatory structure which 
can then be developed over the next five years in a systematic manner – more 
transparent, less complex and headed by professionals with knowledge domain – not 
career bureaucrats. We need a system that will minimize regulatory capture44 but that 
does not choke private investment and allocates resources in a transparent and 
efficient manner. This should also allow private investment in many sectors where it is 
currently restricted, including in natural resources and defense production, and help 
avoid coordination problems which have led to a situation in which India, with the 
second largest reserves in the world, now imports record levels of coal.  
Figure 9: India’s Property Tax Amongst Lowest in the World 
 
                 Source: Author calculations based on OECD and World Bank data bases  
 
44 The Telecomm regulator TRAI started well but is now perceived as being captured by one large 
promoter. The RBI is now considering allowing corporates to own banks.  
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A regulatory review is needed to assess the effectiveness of regulations. One 
principle that must be kept in mind that more complex regulations can create more 
effective outcomes – but they also require much greater capacity to manage, 
implement and monitor those regulations. If that capacity does not exist a simpler 
regulatory structure should be considered. A big deficiency in India is that regulations 
are hard to monitor – corruption abounds and often the left hand of government does 
not know what the right hand is doing. Civil society can play a big role in highlighting 
failures in administering regulations and should be seen by regulatory bodies as an all 
not an enemy – especially in natural resource management. In the financial sector, RBI 
and SEBI are considered competent but disentangling the roles and responsibilities of 
different regulators should also be investigated and a clean-up of the nested 
relationships between the RBI and government must be a priority as well.  
VI. More devolution to Sub-National Government  
    A review is also needed of the roles and responsibilities of the central, state 
and local government. The proliferation of national flagship schemes has blurred the 
role and responsibilities of the Centre and the states and diminished accountability. The 
idea that the Centre will design national schemes which will then be implemented in a 
proscribed manner by state governments and districts with huge variability in their 
capacity and governance quality is itself absurd. The 14th Finance Commission shifted 
larger share of resources to the state level – but much remains to be done to shift more 
resources to the local level (Figure 9). As Kapur (2020) has shown India’s share of local 
government spend and hiring is much lower than in most developed countries but also 
much lower than in authoritarian centrally dominant countries like China where 
delegation and devolution is very substantial making government far more effective. 
One argument that is often made is that India does not even collect enough revenues 
for the needs of the centre and the states – so there is limited scope for shifting more 
resources to the local level. But this argument is spurious. A rise in property taxes – which 
remain amongst the lowest in the world - is the most obvious way to provide more 
resources at the local level without eating into state and central government revenues. 
It remains a surprise why this most obvious way to raise resources for municipal and civic 
infrastructure and help build “smart” cities has not been utilized, so far.  
One big issue that India will face growing forward is the changing composition of 
population by states. The southern states population growth rates are much lower than 
those in the North. Several North-east states and even West Bengal have lowered their 
fertility rates hugely. Their quite legitimate gripe is that, if resources are decided largely 
by population they are being penalized for faster development and better education 
and health services which have pushed their population growth down. This will become 
an even bigger battle by 2026 – when the decision will have to be made on the 
distribution of parliamentary seats which currently are based on the 1971 census.  
           
Some creative options can be considered to reduce this tension between the 
states with fast versus slow growing population. One option is to give credit to states 
which have reduced population growth rates. This would encourage efforts to control 
population in those states where the fertility rate remains very high. 
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            A second would be to give credit to states which have seen greater in-
migration.  The common misperception is that intra state migration is large, but 
interstate migration is quite low. But as the 2016-17 Economic Survey pointed out, 
interstate migration is hugely underestimated and during the decade 2001-2011 could 
have been as high as 60 million and by 2019 when the pandemic struck was as high as 
200 million. Creative ways to give credit to states with in-migration between 1971 and 
2011 could be considered. This would also encourage states receiving migrants to 
provide them better services, which they are now usually denied and discourage 
discrimination against migrants.  
 
             A second worry is that devolution may have gone too far. The 15th Finance 
Commission was asked to examine  "the impact on the finances of the Union 
government of substantially enhanced devolution to the states following the 
recommendation of the 14th Finance Commission coupled with the continuing 
imperative of the national development program - including New India 2022".  Does this 
suggest that the government is having second thoughts on the fiscal devolution it 
accepted earlier? Other countries such as Brazil and Indonesia did claw back big-bang 
decentralization to some extent.  
 
            But in India's such an approach will be counterproductive as the 2014 devolution 
did not lead to any change in the total amount of funds to the states, just the way they 
were delivered. Whereas earlier they were tied up in central flagship schemes they 
were now to be provided in an unfettered form to the states to decide how best to 
spend them. In fact, India needs even greater devolution going forward and remains in 
form a highly centralized country. And as the latest GST imbroglio shows is quite willing 
to go back on promises made to the states.  
 
             A third concern is regarding the request to the commission to examine "control 
or lack of it in incurring expenditure on populist measures." Given the growing concerns 
over rising state deficits - especially in Bihar and Punjab - the concerns over excessive 
state spending are well taken. But it is again very subjective as there is no clear 
definition of "populist" programs. Who decides what is "populist" or realistic?  And what 
of the populist programs in the union budget?  Telling states how to spend their money 
did not work well earlier and will not work well now. In the spirit of “cooperative 
federalism” state governments must be allowed to make their own choices and face 
the electorate in their own performance. Any restrictions added on would deliver an 
additional blow to “cooperative federalism” that GST initially generated, but has been 
set-back, perhaps irreparably, by the 2020 GST imbroglio.  
 
        Other Considerations: Smaller States and More Time Zones to Improve 
Governance and Productivity 
 
 One issue that has not generated enough focus is the optimal size of states 
(provinces) in India. Some are too large to be governed well. The break-up of states, 
politically tortuous as it has been, has led to improved economic development. The 
creation of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh in the 1960’s led to very rapid progress in 
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both states. These had been neglected parts of a much larger Punjab state – but took 
off after their creation. Similarly, Uttaranchal has done well after being hived off from UP 
as has Jharkhand after its split from Bihar and Chhattisgarh from MP.  The latest is the 
split of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh.  
 
                Obvious candidates for further split are UP with a population of 230 million 
Bihar with a population of 120 million and Maharashtra.  With a projected population of 
1.5 billion and assuming an optimal state size of 30 million India should eventually 
become 50 states. By this logic even MP (even after the creation of Chhattisgarh), West 
Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan are candidates for split-ups.  
 
                The current government is pushing for faster development of India’s Eastern 
states. Among other factors – one issue that has not got enough attention is the 
diminution of productivity in the North-East from being forced into an India wide time 
zone.45 Gujnani ((2019) has shown significant effects of sleep timings on years of 
schooling as well. With productive hours considerably affected – especially in winter 
months – a natural productivity boost would come from the creation of two time zone 
for the country. Most people suggest the timeline be drawn between the N_E of India 
and the rest of the country – but this might have political implications. One obvious 
natural longitudinal line would be with Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal and the North-Eastern 
states in one time zone and the rest of the country in another natural time zone.  
 
 
VII. Dealing with the Cancer of Corruption  
 
“Just as it is impossible to know when a swimming fish is drinking water, so it is 
impossible to find out when a government servant is stealing money” 
― Kautilya   
Corruption in India is now an accepted way of life. It’s a deadweight loss. India’s 
corruption score on the Transparency International Index has improved a bit over the 
last 6 years but remains high. The massive scams that India witnessed in the last phase 
of the UPA government are no longer splashed all over the papers. But a new Netflix 
series “Bad Boy Billionaires” shows how deep the rot is in India’s corruption -ridden 
society.  
 India and China both rank 80th in 2019 rankings of the Transparency International 
along with Ghana and Benin and slightly better than Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand 
and Vietnam. But as the joke goes in East Asia you pay a bribe and your work gets 
done. In India even that is not always the case and often bribes are paid to stop your 
competitor – and nothing gets done. Even bribery in India is inefficient. But whatever it is 
bribery is a huge curse on the economy and a massive tax on common people- 
especially the poor. 
 
45 Tea Estates in the North-East have shifted their clocks by and hour to increase daylight savings.  
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How does one address it? Corruption is a symptom of a dysfunctional interface 
between the government and society. But the moment also provides us an opportunity 
to initiate wider reforms to tackle corruption. 
First, we must consider the issue of how much discretionary power the 
government should have and where it should be placed. As James Madison, a 
founding fathers of the American Constitution wrote in the Federalist, ‘In framing a 
government to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this; you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself.’ In India, the discretionary power of the executive has, over time, 
become too great. Laws and rules, contradicting each other, and accumulated over 
the years are open to interpretation by officials. 
 
Second, corruption can be reduced through greater competition or 
contestability. If the services that people need are provided in a contestable way, 
corruption will decline. This has been proved in the case of telecommunications. Twenty 
years ago, every household in India wanted a telephone and people paid bribes to get 
ahead in the queue for connections. With the arrival of mobiles, no one bothered 
about fixed-line connections, but corruption moved to a higher level to procure 2G 
spectrum licenses. India got it right with 3G licenses, which shows that more competition 
and careful design can reduce corruption. The opportunity for corruption exists 
wherever there are excessive controls and public monopolies. Easing access to these 
services will reduce corruption. 
 
Third, greater transparency is needed wherever major financial resources are 
involved. ‘Follow the money’ is a good guide to look for places to prioritize. 
Procurement, licensing and other major public transactions are all areas in need of 
greater public scrutiny and transparency. The procurement and mining laws, where 
public funds and assets are involved, need major upgrading to bring them to global 
standards. The Citizen Right to Information Act has been a significant milestone. But its 
use is not easy and public officials find many ways to withhold information. E-services 
are an effective step forward and wherever introduced have helped citizens meet their 
basic services in a transparent manner. 
 
Fourth, we need incentives against corruption. Singapore had one of the most 
corrupt customs services in the world. It realized that to be a trade and service centre 
for the region, it would have to root out corruption. It now pays its civil servants the 
equivalent of private sector wages. Public sector wages have risen over the years in 
India as well and while not equivalent to private sector levels, they are nevertheless 
competitive. But the public sector requires more merit-based hiring to dispense with the 
system of paying bribes to get stable jobs in public sector undertakings 
 
Fifth, election financing is a major reason cited for political corruption. The US 
faced the same problem around 150 years ago. Meaningful election financing reform 
could be enacted in the USA only in the 1970s. Two areas to start election financing 
reforms would be raising funds for electioneering and containing alleged vote-buying 
schemes. India has unfortunately moved in the opposite direction by introducing an 
opaque system of electoral bonds – whereby donations to political parties can be 
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made without disclosure and without scrutiny by the Election Commission. It is no 
wonder – political parties – are the least trusted institution in the country.  
 
Sixth, India needs a serious judicial reform to ease the backlog of cases. We also 
need more predictability in outcomes, both in the judiciary and in the administration. 
The judiciary remains small and arcane in its procedures – and judicial activism has 
amplified but is very selective and one might even say capricious, often at the cost of 
further delays in the cases piled up at the doors of the courts. Digitization of the court 
system, records hiring more judges and modernizing the system by increasing systems of 
arbitration and commercial courts will also help reduce delays. As the saying goes 
“justice delayed is justice denied” and India is denying justice on a gigantic scale and 
are then open to massive corruption in the judicial system.  
 
 
India signed the UN Convention Against Corruption that sets global standards on 
tackling corruption this year. But it still has a long way to go to meet global best 
practices. The passionate response to corruption in every citizen survey has sent a 
strong message to the government that citizens demand serious and urgent action. 
Such reforms aren’t easy as they will be opposed by narrow interests that have much to 
gain from the status quo. 
 
If Kautilya in the Arthshastra could lay down the methods of dealing with 
corruption, surely modern India, with ambitions of becoming a global power, can take 
on the scourge of corruption. All developed countries had to tackle corruption 
systematically at some point. India now has a historic opportunity to do the same. 
 
VIII. Fixing Welfare: Going from Product to People based Subsidies 
India spends close to four per cent of its GDP on an alphabet soup of welfare 
schemes and subsidies - it has become a welfare state before becoming a developed 
state. Despite its significant costs, India's welfare system is neither comprehensive nor 
very effective - subject to huge leakages and corruption, and not well knit into a 
coordinated whole. 
Subsidies on the 3 Fs - food, fuel and fertiliser - cost 2.5 per cent of GDP, greater 
than the sum assigned to all development schemes. In the 1960s and 1970s, when India 
had mass poverty, subsidizing products, such as food or fuel, made some sense; but 
today, when poverty has declined, product-based subsidies mainly benefit the non-
poor and distort markets. We need to move away from product- to portable people-
based subsidies - especially as India will witness 300 million migrants over the next 15 
years. Cash transfers have proven to be the best delivery option to reduce costs all over 
the world, through better targeting without diluting benefits. An NCAER study found that 
in 2005 The PDS costs Rs 3-4 to deliver Rs 1 of subsidy. There are two parts to this cost – 
the cost coming from problems at the fair price shops – where leakages in fair price 
shops (outright corruption) and mis-targeting errors were abundant.  due to an 
outdated ration card system based on household surveys carried out in 1993-94. A 
subsequent evaluation carried out by NCAER (2016) showed some improvements – 
 
Copyright Ajay Chhibber 2021 37 
especially as the ration cards were updated and Type I (exclusion errors) were 
reduced.  
But the bigger problem lies in the operations of the Food Corporation of India, 
which procures, stores and moves grain from surplus to deficit states and does all this 
very badly. Fixing the FCI maybe one solution but doing away with it altogether must 
also be an option. The one-nation one ration card is what is proposed – but leave 
migrants even more at the mercy of corrupt fair-price shop officials. Better to have cash 
transfer schemes for them and everyone as well.  
One bold solution would be to shift not only to cash transfers on the consumer 
side but also on the producer side, as in Mexico and in Turkey. 46The PM-Kisan scheme is 
a start and could be expanded if all other producer and input subsidies were done 
away with. This would allow the government to collapse fertilizer and all other input 
subsidies into a cash subsidy, allow the private movement of grain from surplus to deficit 
states, with the government buying small quantities needed for its strategic reserve. 
Public stocks would decline from the current level of 80 million tonnes to around 20 
million tonnes, with huge fiscal savings. The entire food market would shift out of 
government hands into private hands. Several emerging economies such as Mexico 
and Turkey have made such a switch with savings of around 60 per cent. For those 
concerned about such a sudden shift, transition arrangements could be made with the 
shift to cash transfers occurring first in urban areas and even by keeping ration shops 
only for BPL households for a while.  
India cannot afford to rely only on Western-style welfare. It runs one of the world's 
largest "workfare" (cash-for-work) programmes, the rural employment guarantee 
scheme - but with mixed success and implementation problems. Part of the problem is 
that there are at least 18 other uncoordinated schemes that deal with rural and land 
development. The MGNREGA scheme itself has seven stated objectives - so it's difficult 
to measure success, especially as none of these seven has any clear yardstick for 
success. Even the basic objective of 100 days of employment is not based on any 
assessment of needs. Some states may need 50 days, and others may need as much as 
150. 
Ironically, more developed states, with better administration, have used these 
schemes more than the more needy backward states, widening further the gap 
between them and the opposite of what one would expect for a scheme designed to 
help the genuinely needy. The assets created have not been durable and their 
creation is not consciously linked to any district- or block-level development plan. In 
2013-14, it cost Rs 175 to deliver Rs 132 of wages, of which about Rs 90 got to 
beneficiaries (using a leakage rate of 30 per cent)47. But if no real assets are created, it's 
better to shift to a simple cash transfer to help the beneficiaries and save money. 
Since last year MGNREGA work has been allowed on private small farms of 
backward communities, which has helped improve land productivity and its 
 
46 This could be considered a quasi-UBI system, a means-tested income transfer not a universal UBI. 
47 Based on author’s calculations using data on accounts of MGNREGA.  
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employment potential by enabling the shift from traditional cereals to more lucrative 
cash crops, vegetables and fruit. But these remain a very small part of the total scheme 
so far. MGNREGA work has been allowed for building toilets - but that diffused its core 
objectives even further and has now fortunately been stopped. 
India needs workfare to complement welfare, but it should be refocused on 
fewer objectives that will increase community resilience to drought and climate 
change such as land improvement, water management and reforestation. It should 
also have a sunset clause so that once the assets are built, MGNREGA support can be 
phased out in an area. 
The health-related schemes also need significant review and rationalization. Of 
India's Millennium Development Goals for 2015, it is furthest behind in maternal and 
infant mortality (and neo-natal mortality). Despite so many schemes, "out of pocket" 
expenses on health, at 60 per cent, are the highest in the world. But in health, cash 
transfers are not the best answer, as shown by the poor experience with Janani 
Suraksha Yojana. Better results are being achieved by the recently introduced Janani 
Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK), which is a cashless scheme designed to provide a 
combined package for the mother and child from seven months of pregnancy to one 
month after pregnancy. It has helped reduce the maternal mortality rate as well as the 
neo-natal mortality rate. The Ayushman Bharat scheme is a start with 1 crore 
beneficiaries in its first- but it should not be an alternative to a functioning health system 
without which over 100 crores are left at the mercy of unregulated private providers.  
IX. Conclusion 
To conclude, India does not need a smaller government or for that matter a 
much larger one, but a more focused, smarter and more accountable government 
with much clearer roles and responsibilities. A two-pronged strategy of reducing its 
scope 48( not size) and improving state capability is the way forward. Countries’ that 
have grasped this nettle have gone through the "middle income trap". China is on its 
way - but many others have floundered. Will India grasp the nettle in the coming year 
and revive its long-term prospects is a hope all of us must ensure. At 8-9 per cent GDP 
growth India can not only eliminate poverty but become an industrial country in three 
decades. At 4-5 per cent growth India is unfortunately stuck in the middle-income trap 
for another 50 years.  
The coronavirus has exposed the inefficiencies in government more sharply. 
India’s inability to manage the pandemic was inevitable given the weak health system 
– with one of the lowest public health spending as a share of GDP in the world. But 
other inadequacies were also exposed including a very weak and badly run social 
safety net and lack of coordination between the center and the states, very 
inadequate funding for local government which at the front-line of the fight against the 
 
48 Meaning the number of things, it gets involved in.  
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pandemic. Trust in public institutions was surprisingly relatively high in India but may now 
have declined as more and more people lost lives and livelihoods.  
This paper has shown a two-pronged strategy for improving the effectiveness of 
government, reduce its scope and improve its capability. Let it do a fewer set of things 
and do them well – keep the regulatory system simple and transparent and avoid 
doing what the private sector and civil society do better. India must also decentralize 
and devolve much more – but also build up greater capability in local government. If 
India is to reset for the 21st century, our future and those of our children lies in reforming 
government now for rapid, sustained long-term growth and a happier society. No quick 
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